17 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Court held that Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada and his siblings are each entitled to a 1/6th share in the land beneath the subject property. The Court found that the mere assertion of filing no-objection certificates/disclaimers with the DDA did not establish that Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada and his siblings had surrendered their interest in the suit property in favour of Mrs. Dayavati. The contesting defendants failed to prove the existence of a subsistence oral family arrangement whereby Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada and the supporting defendants had agreed to relinquish their share in the suit property in favour of Mrs. Dayavati. Mrs. Dayavati had ownership rights only in 50% of the subject property. Since Mr. Savitri Prasada died intestate, his 50% share is to be distributed equally among his heirs falling in Class I of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act. This applies to both the subject property and movable properties, as the contesting defendants failed to prove Mr. Savitri Prasada's Will dated 24.02.1966. The Court further held that Mrs. Dayavati's Will dated 09.11.1992 and codicil dated 24.02.2000 have been proved, and her 50% share will devolve upon Mr. Arun Prasada. Her cash and shares, except for an account with Allahabad Bank, will devolve on her three daughters equally. The 2008 and 2014 suits were not barred by limitation. A preliminary decree will be drawn allocating each of Brigadier (Retd.) Shyam Prasada and his siblings a 1/6th share in the land beneath the suit property. The testamentary case was disposed of in consonance with a previous order. The Court expressly left undecided the specific division of movable properties, other than noting the devolution of Mrs. Dayavati's assets.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that while the Revenue sought to rely on the Supreme Court's decision in New Noble Educational Society, the Supreme Court itself had clarified in paragraph 88 of that judgment that the decision would operate prospectively. This clarification meant that the Revenue could not take advantage of the changed legal position for the assessment years in question. Consequently, the Court was not inclined to frame the question urged by the Revenue and proceeded to dismiss the appeals. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals, with no decision on the merits of the exemption claim itself for the period under review.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had rightly applied the ratio in A.L.A. Firm (supra). The outgoing Directors and shareholders transferred dealership rights, stock of cars, and spare parts (trading assets) at book value. The resultant profits of these assets were also transferred to the outgoing Directors. The assessee had shown a profit of 9.6% on the sale of cars and spare parts. By transferring trading assets at cost price, the profit component, which belonged to the company, was transferred to the outgoing Directors. This profit would form part of the cost of acquisition of shares, dealership rights, and goodwill for the transferee, and such an expenditure is capital in nature and not allowable. Therefore, the gross profit component on the transfer of trading assets at cost price is a profit liable to tax in the hands of the company. The fact that the AO made the addition in the hands of the Directors does not make a difference as the income actually belongs to the assessee and is taxable in its hands. The first substantial question of law was answered in the negative. The second substantial question was answered by stating tax is levied on actual profits. The third substantial question was answered in the affirmative in favour of the Revenue.
The High Court decided both the appeal and the cross-objections. Regarding the claimant's income, the Tribunal's reliance on the Income Tax Return filed before the accident was deemed conservative. While the claim of Rs. 15,000 per month was not fully accepted, the Court found Rs. 5,000 too low. Considering the admitted contracts and the nature of the claimant's work, the monthly income was determined at Rs. 10,000. For functional disability, the Court distinguished medical and functional disability, as per Rajkumar (Supra). It found the Tribunal's 30% assessment too conservative given the amputation and the nature of the claimant's contractor work, determining the functional disability at 50%. Consequently, the compensation was enhanced. The owner's cross-objections succeeded as the driver was found to possess a valid license, and the pay-and-recovery order against the owner was set aside. The total compensation was enhanced to Rs. 18,44,000, to be paid with interest at 9% per annum.
The High Court held that Section 68 requires the assessee to offer an explanation about the nature and source of any sum credited in its books. If the explanation is not satisfactory, the sum can be charged to tax as the income of the assessee. The conditions for Section 68 are the existence of books of accounts, a credit entry, and an unsatisfactory explanation regarding nature and source. The assessee needs to prove the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The Court noted that in the present case, the partners had shown agricultural income in their personal returns, which had been accepted by the department. The partners were identifiable and separately assessed. Since the source of investment was explained, and the partners' agricultural income was accepted, the burden of proving the source of credits was sufficiently explained. Therefore, the addition could not have been made in the hands of the firm. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal was allowed.
The High Court noted that the tax effect in both appeals filed by the Revenue is less than Rs. 2 crores. In accordance with CBDT Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024, the Court disposed of both appeals. The question of law raised in these appeals was left open. The Revenue was granted liberty to apply for restoration of the appeals by filing an interlocutory application within three months from the date of the order, should they discover that the appeals fall within the exceptions provided in the circular.
The High Court dismissed the Petition, upholding the Trial Court's decision. The Court reiterated that the jurisdiction under Section 25B(9) of the DRC Act is revisionary and limited, focusing on errors apparent on the record or absence of adjudication. The Court found that the Petitioner had failed to raise a triable issue. The Trial Court had meticulously examined the Petitioner's contentions regarding alternative accommodation and the bona fide need of the Respondent. The Court noted that the Petitioner had not placed sufficient material to demonstrate the availability of alternative accommodation or to rebut the landlord's stated need. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Abid-Ul-Islam, emphasizing that leave to defend requires substantive material to raise a triable issue, not mere assertions. The Petitioner's arguments regarding conflicting judgments were not found to be substantial enough to warrant interference. Therefore, no ground for interference was made out.
The High Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish his 'readiness and willingness' to perform his part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The court noted significant delays at various stages, including a 2.5-year silence after the defendant's reply notice stating he couldn't convey good title. The trial court's finding on readiness and willingness was deemed insufficient. Furthermore, the High Court determined that Ex.A11, the Will dated October 26, 1983, was a Joint Will, and the mother had only a limited right, not an absolute right to deal with the property. Consequently, the main relief of specific performance was negatived. However, the plaintiff was held entitled to the alternate relief of refund of the advance amount paid under the agreement. The Rs. 20,00,000/- deposited by the plaintiff was permitted to be withdrawn by his legal heirs. The defendant was ordered to pay back the Rs. 3,00,000/- with 9% per annum interest.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The primary reason for dismissal was that the tax effect in the instant appeal was well below the monetary limit of Rs. 2.00 crore, as stipulated by CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024 (amending Circular No. 5 of 2024). The Court referenced paragraph 2 of Circular No. 9 of 2024, which sets the monetary limit for appeals before the High Court. The judgment also stated that if the appeal fell within any exception provided in Circular No. 5 of 2024, the Income Tax Department would be at liberty to seek revival of the appeal. No order as to costs was made. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer, as upheld by the ITAT, was not erroneous. The Court found that the provisions of Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which require scrutiny of activities, became applicable w.e.f. 01.04.2009 and were not applicable to the assessment year 2008-2009. In view of this, the benefit of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act was rightly extended to the assessee for the assessment year 2008-2009. The Court stated that a provision, unless made retrospective by the Legislature, cannot be presumed to be retrospective. Therefore, the Court found no substantial question of law and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court held that the contention of contributory negligence by the Insurance Company was rejected, as the Tribunal had already concluded the accident was due to the negligence of the offending vehicle's driver. Regarding the deceased's age, the Tribunal's reliance on the post-mortem report stating 45 years was upheld, dismissing the claimants' argument for 38 years. However, the Court found substance in the Insurance Company's argument regarding excessive compensation for loss of consortium, reducing it from Rs. 1 lac to Rs. 40,000/- per claimant, citing Supreme Court pronouncements in Pranay Sethi and Rojalini Nayak. Compensation for funeral expenses was fixed at Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- was awarded for loss of estate. The deceased's monthly income of Rs. 10,000/- was deemed not excessive, considering the dependents and evidence. Future prospects were considered, and a multiplier of 14 was applied instead of 13. The total compensation was modified to Rs. 17,65,000/-.
The High Court disposed of the appeals on the grounds of low tax effect, keeping open the questions of law. Liberty was granted to the appellant to apply for restoration of the appeals within three months from the date of the order if they find that the matter is covered by any exceptions in the CBDT circulars. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The appeals were disposed of with liberty granted to the appellant in the aforementioned terms.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was correct in deleting the disallowance of bad debts. The court found that the assessee had entered into business transactions for the sale of land to M/s. Unitech Ltd., and the income from these sales was accepted as business income by the revenue. Consequently, a debtor-creditor relationship arose from these business dealings. The assessee demonstrated that despite reminders and attempts to recover the amount of Rs.7,99,37,826/-, no recovery was made, and M/s. Unitech Ltd. was in a precarious financial position, evidenced by the crash in its share price and its properties being put up for sale. The assessee passed a board resolution to write off the amount as bad debt and made corresponding entries in its books of account. The court noted that the legislature, through amendments to Section 36(1)(vii), sought to reduce the burden on the assessee to prove a debt was bad, aiming to avoid litigation. The assessee had complied with the conditions of Section 36(1)(vii) and Section 36(2) by writing off the debt and taking it into account in computing income for the previous year of write-off. The court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's order, concluding that the claim was in consonance with the relevant sections of the Act.
The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru considered a memo filed by the assessee's counsel seeking leave to withdraw the appeal. For the reasons stated in the memo, the Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The assessee was granted liberty to revive the appeal if the occasion arose. No decision was made on the merits of the substantial questions of law that were intended to be formulated.
The Court held that the market value for the acquired land in village Kilokari should be awarded at the rate of Rs. 2,07,500/- per Bigha. Following the principle laid down in K. Periasami case, this compensation rate shall also apply to the land acquired in villages Khizrabad, Nangli Razapur, and Garhi Mendu, as they were acquired under the same notification and possess similar characteristics. The Court reasoned that the exemplar sale deed dated March 17, 1988, and the uncontroverted evidence of agricultural use supported this valuation. The appellants had already received Rs. 89,600/- per Bigha, and the balance amount, along with interest and statutory benefits, is to be paid. The Court also noted that Section 28A of the LA Act mandates that all persons whose land was similarly acquired under the same notification are entitled to the same judicially determined compensation rate.
The High Court held that the issuance of the VDIS certificate dated 31.03.1998 under Section 68(2) of the VDIS, 1997, to the assessee was a fact recorded in the orders of the CIT(Appeals) and the ITAT, and therefore, could not be doubted. If the certificate was issued and had not been cancelled through a legally recognized process, the benefit thereunder could not be denied to the assessee. The Court noted that the Department itself had issued Section 148 notices and also granted the VDIS certificate, and thus could not accuse the assessee of fraud by pleading ignorance. Since the certificate was admittedly issued and not cancelled in accordance with law, the assessee was entitled to the immunity conferred by the VDIS. Accordingly, questions (i), (ii), and (iii) were answered in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The appeals were allowed.
The High Court, while not deciding the substantive issue of law, observed that if sales made to the individuals who provided credit advances in the previous year were accepted by the department in the subsequent year, this warranted reconsideration by the department. The Court noted that the ITAT had granted liberty to the appellant to approach the authorities. The Court directed the appellant to produce before the jurisdictional Assessing Officer the revised return submitted in 2001 and the acceptance of sales to the individuals for both cull birds and litter. The department was instructed to verify and scrutinize these documents and take appropriate steps for processing the appellant's claim in accordance with the law. The Court clarified that the appellant could only produce records already furnished to the Assessing Officer, including subsequent year's returns and the 2001 revised return, if it was submitted within the limitation period and was still pending. The appeal was disposed of with these observations and directions, leaving the question of law open for future proceedings. No costs were awarded.